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UNITED STATES LAW’S FAILURE TO 
APPRECIATE ART: 
HOW PUBLIC ART HAS BEEN LEFT OUT IN THE 
COLD 
INTRODUCTION 
Art is an integral mode of communication, identification, and 
innovation.1 Artworks in public spaces in particular contribute to societal 
and cultural expression, especially because works of public art and their 
messages are accessible to all.2 With heightened accessibility, however, 
comes a heightened need for protection. Public art’s increasing popularity 
and visibility through projects like Banksy’s viral graffiti art; 3  Anish 
Kapoor’s popular Cloud Gate (commonly referred to as “The Bean”) in 
Chicago;4  and Kristen Visbal’s Fearless Girl, appearing on Wall Street 
overnight on International Women’s Day,5 have generated much interest on 
the topic of public art and both its values and challenges.6 Amidst calls to 
recognize and protect pieces of public art, this Note focuses on the needs of 
 
1. “Public art instills meaning—a greater sense of identity and understandings of where we live, 
work, and visit—creating memorable experiences for all. It . . . can help communities thrive.” Public 
Art, AM. FOR ARTS, https://www.americansforthearts.org/by-topic/public-art [https://perma.cc/S5KT-Y 
Z7J]. 
2. Id. 
3. E.g., Banksy, Girl with Balloon, 2002, stencil mural series, various locations; see also 
Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[N]oted street artist Banksy has 
appeared alongside President Barack Obama and Apple founder Steve Jobs on Time magazine’s list of 
the world’s 100 most influential people. Though often painted on building walls where it may be subject 
to overpainting, Banksy’s work is nonetheless acknowledged, both by the art community and the general 
public, as of significant artistic merit and cultural importance.” (footnote omitted)); Will Ellsworth-
Jones, The Story Behind Banksy, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 2013), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/ar 
ts-culture/the-story-behind-banksy-4310304/ [https://perma.cc/9M83-RYG6]. A print of one of 
Banksy’s most famous works, Girl with Balloon, sold for $1.4 million just before shredding itself. Emma 
Bowman, ‘We Just Got Banksy-ed’: ‘Girl with Balloon’ Sells for $1.4M Before Self-Destructing, NPR 
(Oct. 6, 2018, 9:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/06/655252676/wejust-got-banksy-ed-girl-with-b 
allon-sells-for-1-4m-before-self-destructing [https://perma.cc/P9YB-PABR].  
4. Anish Kapoor, Cloud Gate, 2006, stainless steel sculpture, Millennium Park, Chicago, https:/ 
/millenniumparkfoundation.org/art-architecture/cloud-gate/ [https://perma.cc/L4HV-GMGU]; see also 
LYNN BASA, THE ARTIST’S GUIDE TO PUBLIC ART: HOW TO FIND AND WIN COMMISSIONS 7 (2008) 
(using art in Chicago’s Millennium Park, including Cloud Gate, as an example of public art as an 
“economic asset”). 
5. Kristen Visbal, Fearless Girl, 2017, bronze sculpture, New York Stock Exchange, https://ww 
w.atlasobscura.com/places/fearless-girl-statue [https://perma.cc/3NKR-MK7S]; see also Sandra E. 
Garcia, ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Finds a New Home: At the New York Stock Exchange, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/nyregion/fearless-girl-statue-stock-exchange-.html [ht 
tps://perma.cc/NCE5-PP7M]. Relevant to Section II.B.iii of this Note, Fearless Girl has recently 
changed location. Id.  
6. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 167 (“In recent years, ‘street art’ . . . has emerged as a major category 
of contemporary art.”).  











public artists, whose personal and moral rights were for the first time 
protected,7 albeit incompletely, with the passing of the Visual Artists Rights 
Act (VARA).8 Public art’s unique nature and complex, difficult-to-define 
attributes mean that offering legal protection to artists is both absolutely 
essential and exceedingly challenging.9 While the law has made strides in 
enacting protections for visual artists and their work,10 the exclusionary, 
strictly defined contours of these laws are an ill fit for the amorphous and 
evolving field of public art. As a result, many artists who create public 
artworks are left with inadequate legal protection or, oftentimes, no 
protection at all.11 At the heart of this unfortunate gap in legal protection lie 
attempts by Congress and the courts to articulate a satisfactory definition of 
art. These legal definitions of art determine which pieces will be considered 
protectable art in the eyes of the law, and are of necessity narrower than 
artistic reality.12 As a result, the legal definition of art in any given context 
will depend upon the purpose of the statute and a balancing of competing 
interests.13 The difficult exercise of creating a satisfactory legal definition 
of art is well demonstrated through visual art’s problematic definition in the 
context of artists’ moral rights,14  particularly when viewed through the 
unique lens of public art. It is public artists that are perhaps most in need of 
moral rights, and yet the work of these artists is often ignored by and 
excluded from the legal definition of art in VARA. And this is despite the 
rise of public art in cultural importance and popularity. 15  An adequate 
definition of art must, in the case of public art, appropriately balance the 
interests of public artists, community members, and property owners. 
Instead, VARA’s definition of visual art, and the resulting limited reach of 
 
7. See infra text accompanying note 34. 
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018). 
9. Cameron Cartiere, Through the Lens of Social Practice: Considerations on a Public Art 
History in Progress, in THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ART: ART, SPACE AND SOCIAL INCLUSION 
13, 14 (Cameron Cartiere & Martin Zebracki eds., 2016) [hereinafter EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC 
ART]. 
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
11. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY: EXAMINING MORAL 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 60 (2019), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/moralrights/full-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8793-HLHU] (“The narrowness of [VARA], both as drafted and as interpreted by the 
courts, has, according to many, undermined the effectiveness of the moral rights afforded under 
VARA.”). 
12. A painting that is the identical copy of another artist’s painting, for example, is technically 
considered art, but of course does not fall under the legal definition of art for copyright protection. See 
Leonard D. DuBoff, What Is Art? Toward a Legal Definition, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 303, 
305 (1990). 
13. Id. at 350 (“[T]he legal definition of art greatly depends upon who is doing the defining.”); 
see also infra Section III.B (discussion of the legal definition of art in the contexts of copyright, customs, 
and obscenity). 
14. Cara L. Newman, Comment, Eyes Wide Open, Minds Wide Shut: Art, Obscenity, and the 
First Amendment in Contemporary America, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 121, 145 (2003). 












the Act, denies artists basic, minimal protections, and weighs heavily in 
favor of those who own the property on which their works are displayed.16 
This imbalance undermines VARA’s purpose and has resulted in the 
devastating loss of many precious public artworks.17 
Section I of this Note will provide a history of both the legal and artistic 
developments of public art. Next, Section II will identify and discuss crucial 
problems with the way that VARA defines and limits visual art that prevent 
the statute from providing adequate protection to public artists. Section III 
will then compare the definition of visual art found in VARA to other 
attempts to define art both artistically and legally. Finally, in Section IV, 
this Note proposes removing unnecessary limitations on VARA’s definition 
of visual art and expanding it to resemble copyright’s definition of visual 
art. In order to recognize and protect artists who create the works that define 
the culture and spirit of communities across the country,18 VARA must be 
made more inclusive of public art. 
I. HISTORY  
A. Legal Development 
In general, “[t]he law of copyrights is the single most important area of 
visual arts law.” 19  “Copyright protection allows a creator to profit 
economically from his or her investment of time, skill, and energy by giving 
a limited monopoly in his or her work.”20 Rather than broadly discussing 
copyright protection, codified in the Copyright Act,21  this Note focuses 
more narrowly on the development and protection of an artist’s moral rights, 
or “right[s] given to an artist to assert limited authority over a work of art 
even after the art is sold or transferred.”22 Unlike the economic protection 
provided by copyright law, moral rights were created to protect an artist’s 
 
16. Brian T. McCartney, “Creepings” and “Glimmers” of the Moral Rights of Artists in 
American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35 (1998) (arguing that, while the passage of VARA 
was a positive step, the United States is far from recognizing moral rights in line with the requirements 
of the Berne Convention, as evident from statutory language and subsequent case law). As this Note will 
demonstrate, these deficiencies are even more acute in the context of public art. 
17. See, e.g., infra Section II.A; infra note 36 (describing the destruction of the beloved 5Pointz 
murals in New York City). 
18. See, e.g., infra note 49 (describing Miami’s Wynwood Arts District, a formerly rundown 
community transformed into a vibrant, popular destination through public artworks).  
19. Clarence S. Wilson, Jr., Visual Arts & the Law, in LAW AND THE ARTS – ART AND THE LAW: 
A HANDBOOK/SOURCEBOOK FOR ARTISTS, CRAFTSPEOPLE, ARTS ATTORNEYS & ARTS 
ADMINISTRATORS 82, 83 (Tem Horwitz ed., 1979). 
20. DuBoff, supra note 12, at 304. 
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805, 1001–1205 (2018).  
22. MICHAEL E. JONES, ART LAW: A CONCISE GUIDE FOR ARTISTS, CURATORS, AND ART 
EDUCATORS 143 (2016). 











honor and reputation.23 This separate moral protection is based on the idea 
that “[a]n artist’s professional and personal identity is embodied in each 
work created by that artist,” and thus “[e]ach work is a part of his or her 
reputation . . . [and] is a form of personal expression (oftentimes 
painstakingly and earnestly recorded).”24  
The concept of an artist’s moral rights was first codified in French civil 
law.25  The bundle of moral rights protects artists primarily through the 
inclusion of four rights: (1) the right of disclosure, or the right to control 
when a work is published, if at all;26 (2) the right of attribution, or the right 
to claim and disclaim authorship;27 (3) the right of integrity, or the right to 
prevent intentional modification of a published work;28 and finally, (4) the 
right of withdrawal, or the right to remove a work from the public.29 While 
not widely recognized, moral rights may also include protection from 
excessive criticism and attacks on an artist’s personality.30  
Moral rights are incorporated into the Berne Copyright Convention, 
which requires its members to protect artists’ moral rights at a minimal 
 
23. Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free 
Speech?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 212 (1994) (“Although limited, the protection 
afforded these artists has extended the economic rights provided by traditional copyright law to include 
the protection of the reputation and honor of the artist.”); see also Derek Fincham, Victory for 5Pointz 
Artists in the Second Circuit, ILLICIT CULTURAL PROP. BLOG (Feb. 24, 2020), http://illicitculturalpropert 
y.com/victory-for-5pointz-artists-in-the-second-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/3G6J-P4EZ] (“[A] moral right 
is not an economic right. Instead it accounts for the psychological suffering which takes place when an 
artist’s art has been harmed in some way.”). 
24. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
101-514, at 15 (1990)). 
25. DuBoff, supra note 12, at 333–34. In France today, moral rights are codified in the French 
Code of Intellectual Property. Vera Zlatarski, Note, “Moral” Rights and Other Moral Interests: Public 
Art Law in France, Russia, and the United States, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 201, 204 (1999) (citing 
CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L. 121-1 to L. 121-9 
(Fr.)). For a comprehensive yet critical discussion of moral rights in France, see id. at 201–09. 
26. Kelly, supra note 23, at 216–17. 
27. Id. at 217–18. 
28. Id. at 218–19. 
29. Id. at 219. 
30. Id. at 219–20; Thomas J. Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights: The Immoral Triumph of 
Emotionalism, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 319 (1989) (citing Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral 
Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 573 (1940)). An 
example of the right against excessive criticism in France is found in Editions Gallimard v. Hamish 
Hamilton Ltd. Lenka Řádková, Moral Rights of Authors in International Copyright of the 21st Century: 
Time for Consolidation? 76 (Dec. 18, 2001) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of British Columbia), 
https://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0077577 (citing Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of 
original jurisdiction] Paris, Feb. 15, 1984, [1985] E.C.C. 574 (Fr.)). These moral rights in particular raise 
First Amendment concerns outside the scope of this Note. See Kelly, supra note 23, at 248–49 
(suggesting definitional balancing when conflicts between the two arise). For a First Amendment 
argument in the context of public art, specifically graffiti walls, see Kelly Oeltjenbruns, Note, Legal 













level.31 In response to the increased recognition of moral rights around the 
world, the United States became the Berne Convention’s eightieth member 
on March 1, 1989. 32  To minimally comply with the obligations of the 
convention, Congress passed VARA in 1990, with an effective date of June 
1, 1991.33 Upon its passage, VARA became the first federal copyright law 
in the United States to protect certain moral rights of artists.34 This was 
groundbreaking for the artistic community, as federal copyright laws had 
previously protected only an artist’s economic rights.35 Despite the fact that 
VARA is nearly three decades old, it has recently returned to the public 
spotlight after the Eastern District of New York’s decision to award 
substantial money damages to creators of the destroyed 5Pointz murals36 in 
Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P.37 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision in 
a major victory for public artists.38  
Modeled after the protections provided by the Berne Convention, VARA 
incorporates two of the previously described moral rights, the right of 
attribution and the right of integrity, into federal copyright law.39 The Act 
achieves this by protecting an artist’s right to choose when to claim 
ownership of an artwork,40 and by protecting artists’ work from “intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or modification” that is damaging to their honor or 
reputation.41 In addition, for works of recognized stature, VARA provides 
further protections preventing destruction. 42  These moral rights are 
 
31. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention protects the moral rights of attribution and integrity. 
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (revised 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971); see also Carter 
v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (Carter II), 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) (calling the Berne Convention “the 
international agreement protecting literary and artistic works”).  
32. Kelly, supra note 23, at 220–21; Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
33. JONES, supra note 22, at 144. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 143.  
36. For photos of the 5Pointz murals before and after destruction, see Mallika Rao, Artists Bid 
Sad Farewell to 5 Pointz, New York City’s Graffiti Mecca, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2013, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/21/5-pointz_n_4316483.html [https://perma.cc/NN47-ZVV 
M]; see also 5Pointz, HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2010), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/5-pointz_n_43 
16483?slideshow=true#gallery/5bb26777e4b0171db6a006df/0 (photo gallery of 5Pointz murals); 5 
Pointz NYC, GOOGLE ARTS & CULTURE (2013), https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/5-pointz-nyc/ 
wRU6hVET?hl=en [https://perma.cc/XDE5-LKC9] (same). 
37. Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (awarding a total of 
$6,750,000 in damages to the artist-plaintiffs), aff’d sub nom. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 
155 (2d Cir. 2020). 
38. Amanda Ottaway, Court Upholds Massive Judgment for 5Pointz Graffiti Artists, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/court-upholds-massive-
judgment-for-5pointz-graffiti-artists/ [https://perma.cc/8SU5-FBR4]. 
39. VARA protections are limited to only these two moral rights. JONES, supra note 22, at 144. 
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2) (2018).  
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
42. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).  











waivable but not transferable, and last for the lifetime of the artist.43 As a 
whole, VARA affords protection only to a narrowly defined category of 
works of visual art.44 This shortcoming and its impact on public artists is the 
focus of this Note. 
B. Artistic Development 
In order to understand VARA’s strengths and weaknesses in protecting 
the moral rights of artists, an analysis of public art and its history is 
illuminating. Through recognizing the importance of art in public spaces, 
this Note seeks to find an appropriate balance between the needs of artists 
creating modern public art, and the landowners and communities that own 
and use the spaces into which the art is incorporated.   
1. The Importance of Public Art 
The law must protect the rights and interests of the artists who create 
public art in order to foster their artistic freedom and creativity, and 
subsequently the development of public art. Accessible artistic expression 
plays an important role in individual freedoms, democracy, and shared 
cultural identities in communities. 45  More concretely, there is also an 
economic value to public art. 46  A city with public art attracts young, 
creative, and educated people; communicates that the city is vibrant, 
innovative, and diverse; and even appeals to tourists.47 Art, exemplified 
through the dynamic and functional nature of public art, “cultivat[es] and 
sustain[s] human culture.”48 Public art is a growing commodity in many 
communities and has become an integral part of urban development. In fact, 
 
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)–(e).  
44. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”). For the complete definition of works of 
visual art, see infra Section II. 
45. Nicole Marroquin, Art in Public Space: Democracy in Action, in ART AGAINST THE LAW 
111 (Rebecca Zorach ed., 2014). 
46. See BASA, supra note 4, at 3–7. 
47. Id. at 3–5. For these reasons and more, many groups are interested in acquiring and displaying 
public art. See, e.g., id. at 3–7 (why governments are buying art, including quotes from the managers of 
public art programs in cities around the country); id. at 163–65 (why corporations are acquiring art); id. 
at 165–67 (why hotels desire art); id. at 167–68 (why hospitals collect art).  
48. Jessica Short, Book Note, One Culture and the New Sensibility, CLASSIC J. (Nov. 4, 2016) 














not only does public art play a role in building the culture of a community, 
some community cultures are built around public art.49  
2. What Is Public Art? 
A complete, precise definition of public art, with all its variations, is 
impossible to articulate.50 One attempt at a working definition identifies 
four broad categories of public art:  
Public art is art outside of museums and galleries and must fit within 
at least one of the following categories: 1) in a place freely accessible 
or visible to the public: in public; 2) concerned with, or affecting the 
community or individuals: public interest; 3) maintained for or used 
by the community or individuals: public place; 4) paid for by the 
public: publicly funded.51  
After recognizing that public art can come in many forms, another definition 
distinguishes public art from other types of art:  
What distinguishes public art is the unique association of how it is 
made, where it is, and what it means. Public art can express 
community values, enhance our environment, transform a landscape, 
heighten our awareness, or question our assumptions. . . . Public art 
is a reflection of how we see the world—the artist’s response to our 
time and place combined with our own sense of who we are.52 
Yet another definition of public art begins with this simple statement: 
“[P]ublic art is art in public spaces.”53 Finally, “[t]he most common and all-
encompassing definition of public art is: ‘work created by artists for places 
 
49. See, e.g., Shayne Benowitz, Explore Street Art and Culture in the Wynwood Arts District, 
GREATER MIAMI CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.miamiandbeaches.co 
m/things-to-do/arts-culture/wynwood-s-thriving-arts-culture-scene [https://perma.cc/76UE-2CGA] 
(describing the art viewable in Miami’s Wynwood Arts District, which transformed the community from 
a “dilapidated warehouse district” to a “canvas for world class street art” and tourist destination). For 
before-and-after photographs of Wynwood in Google Map’s street views, see Kyle Munzenrieder, In 
Photos: Ten Miami Neighborhoods that Have Changed the Most in the Past Decade, MIAMI NEW TIMES 
(May 26, 2016, 9:58 AM), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/in-photos-ten-miami-neighborhoods 
-that-have-changed-the-most-in-the-past-decade-8480285 [https://perma.cc/Y5V9-7JNC]. 
50. Cameron Cartiere & Martin Zebracki, Introduction to EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ART, 
supra note 9, at 1, 2 (“[A] definitive, single-sentence definition of public art may never be 
attainable . . . .”). 
51. Id. at 2–3 (footnote omitted) (quoting Cameron Cartiere, Coming In from the Cold: A Public 
Art History, in THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ART 7, 15 (Cameron Cartiere & Shelly Willis eds., 2008)). 
52. What Is Public Art?, ASS’N FOR PUBLIC ART (citing PENNY BALKIN BACH, PUBLIC ART IN 
PHILADELPHIA (1992)), https://www.associationforpublicart.org/what-is-public-art [https://perma.cc/P5 
65-HLHD]. 
53. Public Art, supra note 1. 











accessible to and used by the public.’”54 Recognizing that public art cannot 
be precisely defined, this Note will focus specifically on the many variations 
of public art that are easily accessible to the public.55 Using these definitions 
as a starting point, it is next necessary to examine the history and evolution 
of public art in order to better understand what public art is and the role it 
plays in modern communities. 
3. The Evolution of Public Art 
The historical roots of public art in the United States run deep. 56 
Traditionally, public art was created to meet the goals of commemoration, 
education, and enculturation, such as through memorials, monuments, 
sculptures, and decoration. 57  Public art in the nineteenth century was 
concerned with the “filling of public space with sculptures of political and 
colonial figures,” often raised and positioned in the center of large spaces.58 
In the early twentieth century, however, public art evolved to become about 
“civic rather than colonial expression,” and was created for the purpose of 
urban beautification and as symbols of a city’s desirability and success.59 
Rather than being placed in the center of open spaces, public art at this time 
was woven “into the very fabric of the city.”60 In the 1980s, the art world 
experienced a “public art boom.”61 This rapid development of public art was 
linked to developments in the fields of architecture and urban planning, as 
well as public patronage.62  
As it grew in popularity, public art became more abstract than its 
traditional models. The term grew to encompass “an amorphous new 
category in which art could be almost anything: LED signs, billboards, slide 
 
54. Joni Palmer, Why Public Art? Urban Parks and Public Art in the Twenty-First Century, in 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ART, supra note 9, at 208, 210 (quoting Jack Becker, Public Art: An 
Essential Component of Creating Communities, MONOGRAPH 5 (Mar. 2004), https://www.americansfort 
hearts.org/sites/default/files/PublicArtMonograph_JBecker.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC5E-Z6JT]). 
55. This Note’s understanding of public art is interchangeable with the term “street art.” 
56. For a visual timeline of public art practice from 1950 to 2015, see Cameron Cartiere, Sophie 
Hope, Anthony Schrag, Elisa Yon & Martin Zebracki, A Collective Timeline of Socially Engaged Public 
Art Practice 1950–2015, in EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ART, supra note 9, at 225. 
57. See John Bingham-Hall, Public Art as a Function of Urbanism, in EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF 
PUBLIC ART, supra note 9, at 161, 163 (noting also that public art in the nineteenth century was designed 
to send messages of “the triumph of colonialism and industrial power,” and thus public art at this time 
often took the shape of political monuments); Harriet Senie & Sally Webster, Editor’s Statement: 
Critical Issues in Public Art, 48 ART J. 287, 287–88 (1989). 
58. Bingham-Hall, supra note 57, at 163. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. For example, mid-twentieth-century public art could be understood as “an embellishment 
of small urban spaces and a backdrop to public life rather than a monumental totem to be gazed upon in 
reverence,” as was the traditional function. Id. In line with this view, community murals became popular 
in the late twentieth century. Id. at 164. 
61. Senie & Webster, supra note 57, at 287.  












or video projections, guerrilla actions, [or] suites of waterfalls.”63 Branching 
out from traditional murals, monuments, and sculptures, this so-called “new 
public art” has been distinguished from previous forms by its “dedication to 
extra-aesthetic concerns,” where use is a primary focus.64  
Interestingly, public art seems to have come full circle, back to its 
traditional forms.65 Due to the use of public art in urban real estate to attract 
professionals, developers, and tourists,66 artworks “must once again angle 
for maximum visibility . . . [including] at the focal points of commercial 
plazas.” 67  The utilitarian and abstract modes of public art have now 
combined with these more traditional, municipal modes to create the 
extremely varied forms of public art recognized today.68 Because modern 
public art exists in both conventional and nonconventional forms,69  the 
narrow definition of visual art protected by VARA is exceedingly difficult 
to apply on a case-by-case basis to individual works of art. As this Note will 
demonstrate, this difficulty is particularly problematic for artists desiring 
moral rights protection whose creations fall into the latter category.  
II. PUBLIC ART NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY VARA’S DEFINITION 
OF ART 
In its protection of artists’ rights, VARA’s largest shortcoming is that its 
protections are only available to “author[s] of a work of visual art.”70 A 
“work of visual art” is defined as a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, 
existing in a single copy, [or] in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer.”71 
 
63. Roberta Smith, Public Art, Eyesore to Eye Candy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2008), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/08/24/arts/design/24smit.html [https://perma.cc/QV95-6542]. 
64. Rosalyn Deutsche, Public Art and Its Uses, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC ART: CONTENT, 
CONTEXT, AND CONTROVERSY 158, 163 (Harriet F. Senie & Sally Webster eds., 1992) (quoting Nancy 
Princenthal, In the Waterfront: South Cove Project at Battery Park City, VILLAGE VOICE, June 7, 1988, 
at 99, 99). Such uses include: “to provide a place to sit for lunch, to provide water drainage, to mark an 
important historical date, or to enhance and direct a viewer’s perception.” Id. (quoting Douglas C. 
McGill, Sculpture Goes Public, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 27, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/2 
7/magazine/sculpture-goes-public.html [https://perma.cc/R6DU-ZPCK]). In describing this new public 
art, Deutsche also provides a critical perspective. Id. at 158–68.  
65. Smith, supra note 63 (describing, with examples, the resurrection of public sculpture, and 
nothing that “over the past 15 years public sculpture—that is, static, often figurative objects of varying 
sizes in outdoor public spaces—has become one of contemporary art’s more exciting areas of endeavor 
and certainly its most dramatically improved one”).  
66. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
67. Bingham-Hall, supra note 57, at 164. 
68. See id. (“What was perhaps a final stage bringing public art to the situation we recognize 
today has been the amalgamation of both planning-led public sculpture and artist-led public art practice 
into a ‘cultural economy.’”). 
69. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 117, 157 (examples of abstract and controversial art 
forms). 
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2018).  
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 











The statute also details what is not considered a work of visual art, 
including: “any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, 
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, . . . any 
merchandising item or advertising, . . . any work made for hire[,] . . . [and] 
any work not subject to copyright protection.” 72  This definition is a 
threshold matter that excludes many pieces of art at the outset of a VARA 
inquiry.73 Unfortunately, “[t]he range of art that is not covered by VARA is 
substantial.”74 The exclusionary definition of visual art in VARA affects 
public art more profoundly than other types of art, as pieces of street art are 
more likely to take nontraditional forms or use atypical mediums not 
protected by the statute.75 VARA should play an important role in protecting 
and guaranteeing the basic rights of the most vulnerable artists, and yet, in 
many instances, it largely fails public artists. 76  Not only does limiting 
protectable works to a narrowly defined category of visual art leave some 
public artists with no protection under VARA at all, it also demonstrates an 
attempt by the legislature, and subsequently by the courts, to engage in the 
problematic business of defining what is, and what is not, considered art, or 
at the very least what forms of art are worthy of protection.77 Of course, the 
reality of the legal system and the successful operation of VARA require 
that there be some categorization of art such that the law can be administered 
in a fair and consistent manner. Accepting the difficulty, if not impossibility, 
of defining art,78 however, demonstrates that VARA’s definition of visual 
art must at least be made broader and more inclusive.79  
Instead, the definition of art found in VARA fails to allow for an 
application to many unique art forms, as its rigidness and exclusivity leaves 
some creators of public art with no moral rights protection, and therefore no 
recourse for modified, damaged, or destroyed artwork. VARA’s limited 
scope hurts public artists in particular because its narrow definition not only 
 
72. Id.  
73. “VARA’s definition of ‘work of visual art’ operates to narrow and focus the statute’s 
coverage . . . .” Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 300 (7th Cir. 2011). 
74. JONES, supra note 22, at 147. 
75. See infra Section II.A. 
76. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 328 
(4th ed. 2002) (“Because it must to an extent appeal to the taste of the community and because it is often 
placed out of doors, public art is particularly vulnerable to modification and destruction, as well as to 
publicity. Examples abound of cases where sculptures or murals . . . have been altered or removed 
without the artist’s consent.”). 
77. As Justice Holmes observed, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [visual art].” Castillo v. G & M Realty 
L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
78. See infra Section III.A. 












denies unusual forms of public art protection,80 it also explicitly excludes 
specific art forms commonly employed in public art, including applied art81 
and works made for hire,82 and has additionally been interpreted to exclude 
site-specific art,83 a common form of public art.84 Finally, the Act protects 
from destruction only “work[s] of recognized stature.” 85  VARA, then, 
presents two key definitional problems for street artists hoping to protect 
their work: (1) the categorical and narrow definition of visual art is at odds 
with the mutable nature of art, and thus denies protection to new and unique 
public art forms; and (2) the definition, both explicitly and impliedly, 
excludes a range of valid art forms, particularly common within the field of 
public art, that are deserving of protection. 
A. VARA’s Narrow Definition of Visual Art 
VARA’s limited protection in the context of public art is exemplified by 
the experience of Chapman Kelley. Kelley, using wildflowers to create a 
living painting,86 planted a 1.5-acre garden at his own expense in Chicago’s 
Grant Park, just to see it destroyed after nearly twenty years of efforts to 
preserve and maintain the work. 87  When Kelley’s wildflower art 
installation, titled Wildflower Works, was reconfigured and destroyed, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that he could not bring an action under VARA 
because the piece was not copyrightable,88 and furthermore suggested that 
a living garden could not be considered a painting or a sculpture under the 
Act’s definition of visual art.89 The district court, in contrast, found that 
 
80. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text; infra Section II.A. 
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; infra Section II.B.2.  
82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; infra Section II.B.1; see also Carter II, 71 F.3d 
77, 85–88 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying protection to a sculpture that was found to be a work made for hire 
by an employee).  
83. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006); infra Section 
II.B.3. But see Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 306–07 (7th Cir. 2011) (questioning the 
categorical exclusion of site-specific art in Phillips). 
84. Lauren Ruth Spotts, Note, Phillips Has Left VARA Little Protection for Site-Specific Artists, 
16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 297, 300–02 (2009). 
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2018). 
86. Chapman Kelley, Wildflower Works, 1984–2004, wildflower public art, Grant Park, Chicago, 
http://chapmankelley.com/Gallery.asp?GalleryID=18115&AKey=JLBDK6W2 [https://perma.cc/XX5 
M-PJH3]. Kelley described this work as a physical realization of the paintings he was creating at the 
time. Telephone Interview with Chapman Kelley (Sept. 17, 2019) (notes on file with author). 
87. Deanna Isaacs, Chapman Kelley’s Mutilated Garden, CHI. READER (Dec. 3, 2009), https://w 
ww.chicagoreader.com/chicago/chapman-kelleys-mutilated-garden/Content?oid=1246833 [https://per 
ma.cc/YQW7-LJXN]. 
88. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 306 (finding that Wildflower Works was not “authored” or “fixed”). 
89. Id. at 300–02 (despite the fact that the Park District did “not challenge[] the district court’s 
conclusion that Wildflower Works [was] a painting and a sculpture,” the Seventh Circuit questioned this 
conclusion). 











Wildflower Works90 “could be classified as both a painting and a sculpture 
and therefore qualified as a work of visual art under VARA.”91 The Seventh 
Circuit was deeply critical of this conclusion, fearing that interpreting 
Wildflower Works as either a sculpture or a painting would result in an 
“infinitely malleable” approach.92 The court’s concern in this case echoes 
the very problem inherent in VARA’s inclusion of only limited categories 
of visual art, particularly when strictly defined by the courts: art, in essence, 
is infinitely malleable.93 This realization does not mean that a sufficient 
legal definition cannot be created, but simply that such definitions must be 
inclusive. 
As demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit, in Kelley, VARA’s narrow 
definition of visual art is largely due to an “express concern over the breadth 
of the definition of art” and subsequent attempts “to prevent the law from 
being used for unintended purposes.”94 The way courts and the legislature 
have dealt with these concerns, however, has at times resulted in “dubious 
distinctions concerning what is art.”95  While it is true that for practical 
purposes the definition of art can and must have some limit, the overly strict 
and exclusionary lines drawn by VARA and courts interpreting the Act have 
resulted in the denial of protection to unique pieces of public art like 
Kelley’s Wildflower Works, despite clear artistic function and value. The 
loss of these artworks is a disgrace to the public art community that can only 
be remedied through expanding VARA’s definition of visual art. 
 
90. Wildflower Works consisted of “two large-scale elliptical flower beds . . . spann[ing] 1.5 acres 
of parkland and . . . set within gravel and steel borders,” and was described as “living landscape art.” Id. 
at 293. For a photograph, see source cited supra note 86. 
91. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 295 (citing Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, 
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)). 
92. Id. at 301. 
93. In Kelley, the Seventh Circuit narrowly interpreted VARA’s use of the nouns “sculpture” and 
“painting” to mean that artwork “cannot just be ‘pictorial’ or ‘sculptural’ in some aspect or effect, it 
must actually be a ‘painting’ or a ‘sculpture.’ Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really.” Id. at 300. 
The Seventh Circuit found this interpretation to be necessary to distinguish “painting” and “sculpture” 
in VARA, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018), from “pictorial” and “sculptural” in copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) 
(2018), noting that the former must be a limitation on or subset of the latter. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 300. 
This interpretation is also premised on the assumption that terms such as “painting” and “sculpture” can 
be strictly defined, an assumption that many artists and philosophers would almost certainly deny. See 
supra Section III.A. 
94. DuBoff, supra note 12, at 351 (describing concerns regarding the scope of the definition of 
art across several contexts, including copyright, customs, and state moral rights and consignment 
statutes). 
95. Id.; see also Zlatarski, supra note 25, at 221 (“VARA’s definition of visual art broadly covers 













B. Statutory Exclusions and Limitations  
In addition to excluding nontraditional forms of public art through rigid 
interpretations of the terms “painting” and “sculpture,” VARA also 
disproportionately limits moral rights protection by excluding, either 
explicitly in the statute or implicitly through subsequent judicial 
interpretation, art forms that are common to public art: works made for 
hire,96 applied art,97 site-specific art,98 and art lacking recognized stature.99 
1. Works Made for Hire 
A “work made for hire” is “a work prepared by an employee within the 
scope of his or her employment,” or “a work specially ordered or 
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work . . . if the parties 
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall 
be considered a work made for hire.”100 Because “employee” is not defined 
by the Act, determining whether an artwork is a work made for hire involves 
a balancing test from the law of agency, which considers whether an artist 
was an employee or an independent contractor.101 In Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc. (Carter II), three sculptors sought to prevent the alteration of 
their artwork installed in a building lobby.102 The Second Circuit denied the 
artists VARA protection because the court found that the sculpture 
installation was a work made for hire.103 The court came to this conclusion 
based on the combination of several factors, including the existence of 
employee benefits and tax treatment, and a weekly salary.104 The artists, 
however, had “complete artistic freedom,” meaning that they controlled the 
“manner and means” of the production of the artwork, and created the 
 
96. 17. U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A work of visual art does not include . . . any work made for 
hire . . . .”).  
97. § 101 (“A work of visual art does not include . . . applied art . . . .”). 
98. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006). But see Kelley 
v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 306–07 (7th Cir. 2011). 
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2018) (adding additional protections “to prevent any destruction 
of a work of recognized stature”). 
100. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The “work made for hire” doctrine originates in copyright law. See William 
O’Meara, “Works Made for Hire” Under the Copyright Act of 1976—Two Interpretations, 15 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 523, 523–25 (1982). The distinction was first codified in 1909. Copyright Act of 
1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087–88. The current statutory definition of a work made for hire 
was added in 1976. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 101, 201, 90 Stat. 2541, 2544, 2568. 
101. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989); Carter II, 71 F.3d 
77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the Reid balancing test). 
102. John Carter, John Swing & John Veronis, Jx3, 1991, sculpture installation, Queens, New 
York. For photographs of the artwork installed in the building lobby and later removed, see Bryan K. 
Wheelock, Visual Artists Rights Act Review, HARNESS DICKEY (Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.hdp.com/bl 
og/2017/04/30/visual-artists-rights-act-review/ [https://perma.cc/U5YJ-NXVN]. 
103. Carter II, 71 F.3d at 87–88. 
104. Id. 











sculptures with “great skill in execution.” 105  The conclusion that the 
sculpture installation was a work made for hire is therefore troubling for 
artists because it suggests that property owners can manipulate the works 
made for hire exclusion to their advantage by controlling the financial 
aspects of their business relationship with an artist, even though the 
relationship is not otherwise an employment relationship in practice.106  
Denying works made for hire protection serves, in particular, to 
disadvantage artists who create commissioned public art.107 Removing the 
works made for hire exclusion from VARA is necessary to remedy this 
disadvantage to public artists.108 In addition, this removal would not burden 
property owners hiring artists because these parties are likely working 
through contracts and are therefore already in the best position to negotiate 
a waiver of VARA rights if one is desired.109 Furthermore, the works made 
for hire exclusion makes little sense in the context of VARA, as moral rights 
are personal to the artist. Artists can certainly still suffer a loss of honor or 
reputation as a result of the presentation or modification of works created 
for someone else, but that are on public display. 
2. Applied Art 
Applied art, 110  also explicitly excluded from VARA protection, is 
defined as “two- and three-dimensional ornamentation or decoration that is 
 
105. Id. at 86. 
106. The central inquiry in distinguishing between an employee and an independent contractor is 
whether, in practice, the hiring party had the “right to control the manner and means by which the product 
is accomplished,” Reid, 490 U.S. at 751, though other factors are also considered. Id. at 751–52 (listing 
additional factors). 
107. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 76, at 328 (“[S]ince public art is often commissioned art, 
the artist can be treated as an employee creating the work of art within the scope of his employment.”). 
108. When the works made for hire exclusion was created, “VARA’s authors did not perceive a 
significant relationship between the visual art works they were seeking to protect and the types of visual 
art that tend to be made for hire,” as works made for hire are typically mass produced. U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, supra note 11, at 64. Single-copy commissioned works, common to public art, were therefore 
not fairly considered when the exclusion was included in VARA. Furthermore, removing the exclusion 
and allowing these works to receive protection would not also grant protection to mass-produced works 
made for hire, because § 101 would still require a work of visual art to “exist[] in a single copy, [or] in 
a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). Eliminating the exclusion, then, would 
protect commissioned public artists without unduly expanding the reach of the Act. 
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2018); infra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing waiver). 
110. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” to “include . . . applied 
art” and clarifying that these works are protectable as “useful article[s] . . . only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article”). This limited 
copyright protection for applied art was added in 1976. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 
§ 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2543; see Jane C. Ginsburg, “Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: U.S. 












affixed to otherwise utilitarian objects.”111 In Carter II, the Second Circuit 
limited the reach of the applied art exclusion when it held that merely being 
affixed to a utilitarian object is not enough to transform artwork into applied 
art.112 Despite this one useful limitation on applied art’s application, the 
reach of excluded applied art is troublingly wide, particularly for public 
artists.113 For example, the Ninth Circuit defines applied art as an artwork 
that retains any utilitarian function.114 Under this standard, no matter how 
transformed or creatively designed and decorated, artists who create public 
artworks that double as, for instance, park benches, bike racks, or fountains 
are denied all moral rights protections.115  In Cheffins v. Stewart, artists 
Simon Cheffins and Gregory Jones had no recourse when their artwork, La 
Contessa,116 was dismantled, burned, and sold for scrap.117 Even though the 
artistic value of the ship outweighed any utilitarian function, the Ninth 
Circuit found La Contessa to be applied art, and thus ineligible for VARA 
protection, merely because it was affixed to an out-of-commission but 
working school bus.118  
Decisions like this one undermine not only the artistic nature of applied 
artworks, but also, more significantly, the value of these pieces in our 
communities. 119  Removing the applied art exclusion would encourage 
functional public art in our streetscapes, negate the need for courts to 
interpret the term, and respect the artistic value inherent in these works.120 
 
111. Carter II, 71 F.3d 77, 84–85 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. 
Supp. 303, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). 
112. Id. at 85. 
113. See Brandon J. Pakkebier, Note, Form over Function: Remedying VARA’s Exclusion of 
Visual Art with Functional Qualities, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1329, 1340, 1358–59 (2018) (arguing that 
courts’ refusal to recognize art as visual art if it has functional characteristics is too broad and renders 
VARA ineffective).  
114. Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 593–94 (9th Cir. 2016). 
115. Pakkebier, supra note 113, at 1331 (“[C]ourts crafted tests that refuse to recognize any art 
with functional characteristics—no matter how small—as visual art. Under this current approach, even 
sculpture fountains would not be considered visual art and thus not be protected by VARA. As a result, 
VARA has had a relatively small impact on moral rights protection.” (footnote omitted)). 
116. Simon Cheffins & Gregory Jones, La Contessa, 2002, mobile sculptural replica of Spanish 
galleon, Black Rock Desert, Nevada. 
117. See Derek Fincham, Judges Just Don’t Like VARA and Applied Art, ILLICIT CULTURAL PROP. 
BLOG (Aug. 8, 2016), http://illicitculturalproperty.com/judges-just-dont-like-vara-and-applied-art/ [http 
s://perma.cc/7NU5-JPJ7]. 
118. Cheffins, 825 F.3d at 595 (noting that La Contessa was “visually transformed through 
elaborate artistry,” but finding it conclusive that it “continued to serve a significant utilitarian function 
upon its completion,” since it was “used for transportation”). 
119. See Asmara M. Tekle, Rectifying These Mean Streets: Percent-for-Art Ordinances, Street 
Furniture, and the New Streetscape, 104 KY. L.J. 409, 434–35 (2015) (noting that public art has evolved 
to favor small and utilitarian pieces, and recommending the installation of artistic yet functional street 
furniture to transform urban streetscapes). 
120. The proposal in Part IV ensures that the removal of the applied art exception would not 
expand VARA’s coverage to include purely utilitarian public objects, as works would be subject to 
copyright’s separability analysis. See infra note 187. 











3. Site-Specific Art 
While not explicitly excluded by the statute, VARA has also been 
interpreted to exclude site-specific art, a denial of protection that almost 
exclusively limits the rights of public artists. 121  Site-specificity is “a 
technique in which context [is] incorporated into the work itself,”122 or, in 
other words, in which the work’s location is part of the art. Public art is 
uniquely suited to site-specific art, as the placement of public art in various 
locations is often intentional and powerful. In Phillips v. Pembroke Real 
Estate, Inc., for example, David Phillips objected to the removal and 
relocation of his artwork, a sculptural installation,123 during a redesign of 
Eastport Park in Boston.124 The First Circuit denied Phillips any remedy 
under VARA because, under the Act, changing the placement of a piece of 
artwork is not considered a destruction or modification, and therefore does 
not trigger protection.125 Because location is incorporated into site-specific 
artwork as an integral component of the piece, “[t]o remove a work of site-
specific art from its original site is to destroy it.”126 The ruling in Phillips, 
then, enables property owners to change the location of site-specific pieces 
at their whim, altering the meaning of artworks and diminishing the value 
of public art placed intentionally in certain spaces, without giving the artist 
a voice or even minimal notice. Expressly including site-specific art in 
VARA’s definition of visual art would resolve any disagreement among the 
circuits regarding the status of site-specific art,127 and rightfully protect 
works specifically created to respond to the nature, community, or history 
of a site, which would be effectively destroyed if moved.128 
 
121. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 139–43 (1st Cir. 2006). But see 
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 306–07 (7th Cir. 2011). 
122. Deutsche, supra note 64, at 159. Site-specificity can also “encompass the individual site’s 
symbolic, social, and political meanings as well as the discursive and historical circumstances within 
which artwork, spectator, and site are situated.” Id. 
123. David Phillips, Chords, 2000, granite sculptural installation, Eastport Park, Boston. For a 
photograph of Phillips’s site-specific sculpture pieces, see Aleks Berger, Eastport Park Public Art, 
URBAN CULTURE INST., https://www.urbancultureinstitute.org/uploads/1/1/4/6/11465358/eastportpark_ 
aleksberger.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT5A-BBNV]; Wheelock, supra note 102. 
124. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 131. 
125. Id. at 133, 139–41; 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2018) (“The modification of a work of visual art 
which is the result of . . . the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work is not a 
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . .”). 
126. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 129. 
127. Compare Phillips, 459 F.3d 128, with Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 306–07 (7th 
Cir. 2011). 
128. One commentator noted that explicitly including site-specific works in VARA would be 
“barely more burdensome to property owners, and, appropriately, a good deal more respectful to 
authors.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 73. The proposed changes discussed in Part IV 
preserve pre-existing protections for property owners to minimize the burden of including protection for 












4. Works of Recognized Stature 
While all artwork falling within VARA’s definition of visual art can 
receive protection from intentional, reputation-damaging “distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification,” only creators of art of recognized stature 
can bring suit under VARA to prevent or receive compensation for the 
complete destruction of their art.129  This presents several key issues: it 
creates both a definitional problem resulting in costly litigation and harmful 
incentives for property owners, neither of which are justified by a balancing 
of interests between property owners and artists. 
First, the recognized stature requirement results in a definitional problem 
that goes hand in hand with the complexity of defining what is and is not 
art. In other words, even accepting that a particular work should be 
considered art, how is a court to then assess if the work is of recognized 
stature? The meaning of recognized stature, though of less practical import 
than the definition of visual art, is even more difficult to identify. As an 
initial matter, VARA provides no guidance on how the term should be 
understood.130 The need to assess recognized stature, then, has resulted in 
costly litigation for both artists and landowners alike. 131  Because a 
definition of recognized stature is not included in the statute, deciding 
whether or not a work is eligible for protection from destruction under 
§ 106A(a)(3)(B) has been a matter of interpretation for the courts.132  
In Cohen, for example, a district court in the Eastern District of New 
York had to assess the stature of each of forty-nine individual murals at the 
whitewashed 5Pointz site.133 In doing so, the court considered, among other 
evidence, expert testimony, the careers and artistic recognition of the artists, 
and the appearance of the 5Pointz murals in media such as movies, 
television, and even social media.134 Based on this evidence, forty-five of 
 
author of a site-specific work should they want to remove or destroy the work, or they can negotiate a 
waiver of VARA rights at the outset. See infra Part IV.B. 
129. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2018). 
130. See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 437–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that 
recognized stature “is not defined in VARA” and debating the appropriate evidentiary standard), aff’d 
sub nom. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020). 
131. See, e.g., Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 430 (recognizing the “extraordinary work” of the 
advisory jury in completing the “difficult task . . . [of] having to assess the defendants’ liability in respect 
to each of the 49 works of art,” which turned on the issue of recognized stature); Martin v. City of 
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (artist’s ability to recover under VARA turned on whether a 
destroyed outdoor sculpture was a work of recognized stature).  
132. Martin, 192 F.3d at 612 (“In spite of its significance, [recognized stature] is not defined in 
VARA, leaving its intended meaning and application open to argument and judicial resolution.”); Carter 
v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (Carter I), 861 F. Supp. 303, 324–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
133. Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 439–41. 
134. Id. at 438–39. While the court made independent conclusions, it was aided by advisory jury 
findings. Id. at 430–31. 











the forty-nine works passed muster under the recognized stature standard.135 
Four murals, however, were not found to be of recognized stature and 
received no remedy.136 In explaining this conclusion, the court noted a lack 
of “third-party attention” and “social media buzz” for all four.137 Despite the 
overall victory for public artists in the case and its affirmance, the court’s 
focus on third-party recognition in excluding four pieces from relief does 
not bode well in future cases for new artists or artists who have yet to gain 
a large following.  
In addition to creating litigation in the courts, the recognized stature 
limitation on protection from destruction incentivizes property owners to 
destroy artwork that they have damaged or wish to modify. Modified or 
damaged artwork can trigger VARA protections, but destroyed works, if not 
of recognized stature, cannot. 138  This incentive creates a loophole that 
makes no sense given VARA’s purpose of protecting artists and their works: 
if not of recognized stature, a modified or damaged work may give rise to 
liability—completely destroy that work, and the liability vanishes.139  
In light of these problems, the recognized stature requirement for 
protection from destruction is unjustified, and removing the requirement 
would place minimal burdens on property owners. To start, VARA only 
prohibits the actual destruction of artworks, and thus a property owner no 
longer wishing to display a piece of art could remove the work and store it 
out of sight.140 In addition, for pieces incorporated into a building (such as 
painted onto a wall) whose removal would automatically cause their 
destruction, all that is required under VARA is a good faith effort to provide 
ninety-days’ notice prior to destruction so that artists, if they choose, can 
retrieve their work at their own expense. 141  This added protection for 
property owners for works affixed to buildings, commonly called the 
 
135. Id. at 439–40. The prevailing standard used by courts in assessing recognized stature was 
articulated in Carter I: “(1) that the visual art in question has ‘stature,’ i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and 
(2) that this stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some 
cross-section of society.” Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 325. This standard was recently re-worded by the 
Second Circuit: “We conclude that a work is of recognized stature when it is one of high quality, status, 
or caliber that has been acknowledged as such by a relevant community.” Castillo, 950 F.3d at 166 
(citing Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 324–25). 
136. Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (adopting the advisory jury’s findings that Jonathan Cohen’s 
Drunken Bulbs, Akiko Miyakami’s Japanese Irish Girl, Carlos Game’s Faces on Hut, and Jonathan 
Cohen and Rodrigo Henter de Rezende’s Halloween Pumpkins were not of recognized stature).  
137. Id. The court also took into account the obscure location of one of the pieces and the seasonal 
nature of another. Id. 
138. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2018), with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
139. Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (finding that “Japanese Irish Girl was destroyed and therefore 
not ‘distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified’”). 
140. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). This would allow an artist to at least recover his or her piece, 
rather than losing it altogether. But see supra Section II.B.3 (for site-specific art specifically, a removal 
may result in destruction). 












Building Exception, would effectively balance the interests of artists and 
property owners even if protection from destruction was expanded to 
include artwork at all levels of recognition.142 Given these minimal burdens 
and major drawbacks, it seems not only reasonable but also desirable to 
extend § 106A(a)(3)(B) protection to any and all works of visual art, no 
matter the perceived stature. While the purpose of the recognized stature 
requirement is to balance artists’ interests with the interests of landowners 
who no longer wish to display certain artworks, VARA protections are not 
onerous.143 As a result, every artist, regardless of fame or success, should 
have the right to save his or her work from destruction.144 
Taken as a whole, the narrow definition of visual art, which excludes 
works for hire, applied art, and potentially site-specific art, and the 
requirement of recognized stature in the context of destroyed works, both 
threshold inquiries, demonstrate that VARA disproportionately 
disadvantages artists who create public art. This not only denies basic rights 
to public artists, but also undermines public art’s importance in cultural 
expression, social cohesion, education, and community and economic 
development. 
III. DEFINING ART: AN ARTISTIC AND LEGAL INQUIRY  
As has been demonstrated, what makes VARA so problematic for public 
artists is not the scope of moral rights that it provides, but the scope of the 
definition of visual art that is eligible to receive these protections. Providing 
basic moral rights protection for public art therefore would not require 
artists to receive additional and unprecedented protections.145 Instead, it 
 
142. “[The] ‘Building Exception’ in section 113(d) . . . expressly balances the conflict between 
the moral rights of artists (including the social and cultural value of preserving the artwork those artists 
create) and the property rights of building owners who have allowed the artwork to be created on their 
buildings.” Susanna Frederick Fischer, Who’s the Vandal?: The Recent Controversy over the 
Destruction of 5Pointz and How Much Protection Does Moral Rights Law Give to Authorized Aerosol 
Art?, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 326, 328 (2015). 
143. See infra Section IV.B. 
144. After the whitewashing of the 5Pointz murals, one graffiti artist, William Tramontozzi, 
commented that the destruction was “a crime against the culture of the city.” Greg Howard, Graffiti Gets 
Paid at 5Pointz. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/nyregi 
on/graffiti-artists-5pointz.html [https://perma.cc/4DPB-EAJJ]. 
145. It is worth noting that VARA is deficient in more ways than are discussed in this Note. 
Adding additional moral rights protections would be a good step, especially given that VARA only 
minimally complies with the Berne Convention. E. Scott Johnson, International Copyright, in THE 
MUSICIAN’S BUSINESS & LEGAL GUIDE 91, 93 (Mark Halloran ed., 2017) (noting that “some still believe 
the United States is not in compliance with Berne’s minimum standards with respect to moral rights,” 
as VARA “amended the U.S. Copyright Act to include a very limited and rather anemic moral rights 
provision”). VARA’s other deficiencies are valid, but are out of the scope of this Note, which is focused 
on advocating for an expansion of VARA’s coverage to include works of public art that are currently 
receiving no moral rights protections.  











would involve expanding VARA’s definition of art to provide pre-existing 
protections to a larger category of worthy artworks, and, in the process, 
removing arbitrary and subjective distinctions between what works are 
legally protectable visual art and what works may be freely moved, 
modified, and destroyed without the artist’s consent or even knowledge. In 
order to better understand why VARA’s definition of visual art fails public 
artists, it is necessary to delve deeper into the definition of art on two levels: 
first, the scholarly and artistic struggle to define art; and second, successful 
and unsuccessful attempts in other art law contexts to craft both a flexible 
and appropriately tailored legal definition of art. 
A. Definitions of Art from Art Theory 
While drafting a definition of art is a necessary part of passing coherent 
and enforceable laws, creating an effective legal definition requires first 
recognizing the impossibility of defining art from artistic, linguistic, and 
philosophical perspectives.146 When the definition of art is inflexible, legal 
protection of artwork is awarded, limited, or completely denied based on 
the assumption that art can be readily recognized and delineated, a notion 
that even scholars in the field of art, much less law, cannot agree upon.147 
In fact, even when developing complex theories attempting to create 
coherent definitions of art, many art scholars have advised against adopting 
a concrete definition.148  
Over the centuries, art scholars, historians, and philosophers alike have 
attempted to create varied and at times conflicting theories of art, which 
each present different ways of discovering characteristics that all art has in 
common, and by which art can therefore be identified.149 These definitional 
attempts are rooted in many varying types of aesthetic theories, including 
 
146. For a discussion of developing a definition of art in the legal sphere, see DuBoff, supra note 
12. 
147. See infra notes 148–153 and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., Warren L. d’Azevedo, A Structural Approach to Esthetics: Toward a Definition of 
Art in Anthropology, 60 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 702, 712 (1958) (“The concept of art proposed in this 
paper is clearly tentative and heuristic. No attempt will be made to reduce it to a compact, definitive 
statement.”). 
149. See Thomas Adajian, The Definition of Art, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 













naturalism,150  pluralism,151  essentialism,152  and anti-essentialism.153 Anti-
essentialism is particularly relevant here because the theory rejects the 
notion that art can have an identifiable essence, or set of characteristics used 
to define it.154 This anti-essentialism viewpoint uncovers why attempts to 
create categorical definitions of art will ultimately fail. After all, a thing’s 
essence depends on the historical and cultural context in which it is 
located.155  
Art scholars have also attempted to articulate what, exactly, characterizes 
public art specifically. 156  The process of identifying and characterizing 
public art is even more complex due to the added elements of public 
interaction 157  and public perception, 158  as well as public art’s often 
ephemeral nature.159 Attempts by art scholars to define elusive categories of 
public art prove that any effort to define visual art too narrowly in a statute 
such as VARA is a mistake. The law, and the courts interpreting it, have 
been engaging in exactly this type of inquiry, as VARA and its precedents 
divide art into concrete categories along lines as bright as the art they 
interpret. Overly exclusionary definitions, however, must be avoided, as 
they are not adaptable to the flexible and at times transitory nature of art and 
the art movement, and thus cannot adequately protect artists and their 
unique visions.160 While it makes sense for the law to strive towards a clear 
 
150. See Denis Dutton, A Naturalist Definition of Art, 64 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 367 
(2006). 
151. See Roundtable Discussion, Pluralism in Art and in Art Criticism, 40 ART J. 377 (1980). 
152. See Arthur C. Danto, Art, Essence, History, and Beauty: A Reply to Carrier, a Response to 
Higgins, 54 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 284 (1996); T.J. Diffey, Essentialism and the Definition 
of ‘Art,’ 13 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 103 (1973); Robert T. Cole, Essentialism in Art, ROBERT COLE 
STUDIOS, http://www.studiocole.com/essentialism.html [https://perma.cc/64YJ-PSAM]. 
153. See Lauren Tillinghast, Essence and Anti-Essentialism About Art, 44 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 
167 (2004). 
154. Id. at 169. Anti-essentialists recognize that art can have inherent properties, but contend that 
these features do not amount to a complete definition of art. Id. 
155. See Diffey, supra note 152, at 118–19 (criticizing his own essentialist views). 
156. See Nicholas Alden Riggle, Street Art: The Transfiguration of the Commonplaces, 68 J. 
AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 243, 244–51 (2010); David H. Fisher, Public Art and Public Space, 79 
SOUNDINGS 41, 43–45 (1996). 
157. As an extreme example, works of Félix González-Torres ask the viewer to unwrap a piece of 
candy and contribute to the eventual erosion of the piece over time. E.g., Félix González-Torres, Untitled 
(Portrait of Ross in LA), 1991, candies individually wrapped in multicolor cellophane, Art Institute of 
Chicago, https://www.artic.edu/artworks/152961/untitled-portrait-of-ross-in-l-a [https://perma.cc/6S46-
LKFP]; see Gregory S. Alexander, Objects of Art; Objects of Property, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
461, 462–65 (2017) (describing González-Torres’s works as “blurring . . . the line between the public 
and the private” by asking audiences to participate in and change the art). 
158. Martin Zebracki, Beyond Public Artopia: Public Art as Perceived by Its Publics, 78 
GEOJOURNAL 303, 303 (2013); see also Senie & Webster, supra note 57, at 288 (“All discussions of 
public art should consider a meaningful definition of the public.”). 
159. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that much of public 
art is temporary); see also Patricia C. Phillips, Temporality and Public Art, 48 ART J. 331, 333 (1989). 
160. See supra Section II. 











and predictable definition of art, it is also simultaneously important to 
protect, and therefore encourage, the artists who create new and inventive 
art in the public spaces that communities enjoy, come together around, and 
learn from every day. A broader and more flexible definition would better 
balance these goals. 
B. Legal Definitions of Art 
Keeping the disagreements and warnings of the artistic community in 
mind, a legal definition of art can and should be codified. Because the 
concept of art is so malleable, its legal definition must be specific to the 
context, or law, to which it is applied, keeping in mind the varying interests 
at stake and the overall purposes of the statute. Copyright, customs, and 
obscenity law are three areas that have endeavored to create such a legal 
definition. In each of these art law contexts, as in VARA, the definition of 
art is crucial as a threshold matter. Copyright and customs provide positive 
examples of areas of the law where the definition of art has been 
meaningfully expanded to respond to both the needs of the field and the 
purposes of the statutes in question, whereas obscenity law serves as a 
counterexample in which, as in VARA, the definition of art has been unduly 
restrained.  
1. Copyright 
Before VARA established moral rights for artists, artists could rely on 
the Copyright Act to protect only their economic interests in an artwork. 
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”161 The visual art included in this protection 
is defined as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”162 Fortunately, this 
definition is broad: 
[T]he definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” carries 
with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or 
intrinsic quality. The term is intended to comprise not only “works of 
art” in the traditional sense but also works of graphic art and 
illustration, art reproductions, plans and drawings, photographs and 
reproductions of them, maps, charts, globes, and other cartographic 
works, works of these kinds intended for use in advertising and 
commerce, and work of “applied art.”163  
 
161. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
162. Id.  












Though the categories of protected art are broad,164 the Copyright Act 
imposes some limitations on this definition of art, as the language of the Act 
requires that works be “original” and “fixed.”165  Two key issues courts 
focus on in determining copyright eligibility are originality 166  and 
separability.167 Thus, visual art for copyright purposes must be original, 
fixed, and severable from purely functional features.168 In contrast to the 
recognized stature limitation for VARA claims involving destruction, the 
copyright inquiry focuses on “originality and creativity” as opposed to 
“financial returns or public favor.”169 The broad, flexible definition of art in 
the copyright context reflects a desire to protect, reward, and encourage 
artists who create new and inventive works.170 
2. Customs 
Copyright is not the only area of law in which art must be defined. In the 
context of customs law, “[t]he legal definition of art . . . is crucial since 
certain items, if classified as works of art, enter the United States duty-
free.”171  While customs laws originally applied duty-free status only to 
more traditional forms of art, the legal definition of art in customs law was 
expanded to include modern art in unique forms and media.172 The 1989 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System then expanded the 
 
164. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The use of the adjectives 
‘pictorial’ and ‘sculptural’ suggests flexibility and breadth in application.”). 
165. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
166. DuBoff, supra note 12, at 305. For non-derivative works, only a “minimal amount of 
originality” is required. Id. 
167. This second test is used when determining whether a piece that incorporates utilitarian 
objects is copyrightable applied art or uncopyrightable industrial design. Id. 
168. For a concise summary of DuBoff’s two-step analysis for “[l]egally defining art for copyright 
purposes,” see id. at 321; see also supra note 110. 
169. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204, 1207–08 (D.D.C. 1988), rev’d on other 
grounds, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
170. A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/circs/ 
circ1a.html [https://perma.cc/EFK3-ZJZ7] (“[T]he purpose of the copyright system has always been to 
promote creativity in society . . . .”).  
171. DuBoff, supra note 12, at 322 (noting also that “[t]he customs courts have been grappling 
with the definition of art for customs regulation purposes for decades”).  
172. Id. at 323. This was achieved first in Brancusi v. United States, in which a customs court 
expanded the definition of art for customs purposes to include modern art. T.D. 43063, 54 Treas. Dec. 
428 (Cust. Ct. 1928) (“We think that under the earlier decisions this importation would have been 
rejected as a work of art, or, to be more accurate, as a work within the classification of high art. Under 
the influence of the modern schools of art the opinion previously held has been modified with reference 
to what is necessary to constitute art within the meaning of the statute, and it has been held by the Court 
of Customs Appeals that drawings or sketches, designs for wall paper and textiles, are works of art, 
although they were intended for a utilitarian purpose.”). The definition of art was expanded further with 
the inclusion of the language “in any other media” in the 1959 Customs Law Amendments, Act of Sept. 
14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-262, 73 Stat. 549, repealed by Tariff Classification Act of 1962, tit. I, § 101, 
76 Stat. 72, 72–73.  











legal definition of art even further when it removed previous limitations to 
duty-free art, including eliminating the requirement that sculptures be 
created by a professional sculptor, and removing references that excluded 
artwork associated with industrial use.173 Reasonable limitations were also 
imposed, such as that frames will only be considered part of an artwork if 
they “are of a kind and of a value normal” to the work to avoid manipulation 
of customs law by importing cheap art in expensive frames.174 Overall, the 
legal definition of art in the customs context has been broadened over time 
to eliminate overly complex and outdated limitations, and to better serve the 
purpose of the statute to assign duty-free status to those items that will not 
compete with American-made goods.175 
3. Obscenity 
The legal definition of art is also important in the context of obscenity 
and the First Amendment, as the law draws a line between art and obscenity. 
The Supreme Court held in Miller v. California that the standard for 
determining whether a piece is obscene, and therefore not protected by the 
First Amendment, is: “(a) whether ‘the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct . . . ; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious . . . artistic . . . value.” 176 
Troublingly, this test requires courts to go beyond the definition of art itself 
to the even more elusive distinction between good art (that has artistic value) 
and bad art (that does not).177 Like VARA, this language is problematic 
because it asks courts to make subjective and arbitrary distinctions that they 
are simply not equipped to make.178  
In contrast, copyright and customs law protects all artworks falling 
within the field’s legal definition of art regardless of perceived merit. While 
VARA does not explicitly call for a value determination of artwork in its 
definition of visual art, its limitation to more traditional forms of art 
effectively causes courts to make such determinations, such as whether or 
not Kelley’s Wildflower Works maintained enough artistic merit to qualify 
 
173. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, § XXI, ch. 97, USITC Pub. 2232 (1990); 
DuBoff, supra note 12, at 324, 328. 
174. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, § XXI, ch. 97, USITC Pub. 2232 (1990); 
DuBoff, supra note 12, at 332. 
175. DuBoff, supra note 12, at 323, 333. 
176. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 
408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). 
177. Newman, supra note 14, at 145.  
178. Id. at 152 (“Rather than drawing a firm line between art and obscenity, the Miller test 












as a painting or a sculpture under the Act.179 Furthermore, the recognized 
stature requirement for destroyed works injects a similar, more explicit 
value determination into the statute. 180  Rather than continue to impose 
limitations and exclusions that result in subjective value judgments, as in 
obscenity law, VARA would benefit from a broader definition of art, as has 
been accomplished in the copyright and customs contexts. As in copyright, 
VARA’s coverage must be broadened to protect and foster creativity. As in 
customs, VARA must evolve to respond to changes in the practice of art 
over time. In both copyright and customs law, broad definitions of art have 
been adopted and appropriately tailored in line with the purposes of the law 
in question. VARA should be amended to accomplish the same. 
IV. A PROPOSAL TO REFORM VARA: A MORE INCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF 
VISUAL ART 
In response to a growing recognition of the need to increase protection 
for public art, diverse solutions have been presented.181 In order to fulfill its 
purpose to preserve art and protect the moral rights of artists, as well as the 
culture of communities,182 VARA should be amended to be more inclusive 
of the types of artwork protected, and the level of recognition of artwork 
allowed heightened protections. This Note’s suggested expansion of the 
definition of visual art to more closely match copyright law would 
adequately balance the interests of artists and property owners, both of 
whom have a stake in the scope of moral rights protection.  
A. Expanding the Definition of Visual Art 
In order to adequately protect public artists and serve VARA’s 
purposes, 183  the definition of visual art in 17 U.S.C. § 101 should be 
expanded to encompass a wide and flexible array of artistic techniques, 
styles, and mediums. 184  Rather than attempt to codify strict limits of 
 
179. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra Section II.B.4. 
181. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 68, 80–81 (recommending several 
legislative changes to VARA using language from the California Art Preservation Act); Christian Ehret, 
Note, Mural Rights: Establishing Standing for Communities Under American Moral Rights Laws, PITT. 
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2010, at 1, 11–15 (arguing in favor of granting communities standing to 
assert VARA rights in order to protect beloved public artworks when the artist is unavailable). 
182. VARA does not just protect artists, but also the public. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 
F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020) (“VARA protects ‘the public interest in preserving [the] nation’s culture.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Carter II, 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995))). 
183. JONES, supra note 22, at 144 (identifying policy reasons for VARA as including 
“recogniz[ing] society’s interest in encouraging artists to work creatively” and “respect[ing] the public 
cultural value in preserving works of art”). 
184. See Appendix A. 











protectable visual art, VARA must allow courts to openly examine works 
on a case-by-case basis, guided by the testimony of artists, art experts, and 
even, particularly in the case of public art, public opinion. In making this 
inquiry, a flexible, broad definition of visual art is essential, and can be 
achieved in a way that is already definable by and familiar to the courts by 
expanding the visual art protected under VARA to more closely match the 
broad definition of visual art already protected by copyright law. When 
assessing VARA eligibility for a work of visual art, instead of asking 
whether a work qualifies as a “painting” or “sculpture,” courts would ask if 
the work of visual art in question is copyrightable, or if it is an “original 
work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium or expression.”185 
Applying the broader definition of art found in the context of copyright 
law186 to moral rights protection would result in more efficient legal change, 
as its contours have already been extensively litigated and interpreted by 
courts.187 In fact, copyright law has already in a sense been incorporated into 
VARA, as any artwork not subject to copyright protection is also not subject 
to moral rights protection.188 By broadening VARA’s definition of visual 
art to encompass works of visual art protected under the copyright definition 
as shown in Appendix A, VARA would be extended to protect a wider 
variety of public artists whose works are currently copyrightable but not 
eligible for moral rights protection.189  Furthermore, the more expansive 
 
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); supra Section III.B.1; infra Appendix A.  
186. See supra notes 161–170 and accompanying text. 
187. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.08 (2019). 
For example, rather than denying moral rights protection to artists of any applied art, courts in the moral 
rights context could use the already existing (and more generous) separability test. See supra notes 110, 
167.  
188. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); see 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 8D.06[A][1] (2007) (“[G]eneral copyright doctrine is inextricably implicated in the 
analysis of artists’ rights.”). 
189. An engaged reader may be wondering: what about protection for Kelley’s Wildflower Works? 
While the Seventh Circuit expressed skepticism that Kelley’s work could be considered a painting or a 
sculpture, its decision ultimately rested on the fact that it was not copyrightable, as it found Wildflower 
Works was not authored or fixed. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that planting material “is not stable or permanent enough” to result in a fixed work of art, and 
that “gardens are planted and cultivated, not authored.” Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304–05 
(7th Cir. 2011). Based on this ruling alone, Kelley’s work and others like it would not benefit from this 
Note’s proposed solution. This Note, however, further argues that art like Wildflower Works should 
receive copyright protection, and therefore the full benefit of VARA rights under the proposed changes. 
Kelley’s medium of wildflowers was certainly atypical, but he designed the piece just like he would any 
other painting. He planned every part of the design, including the shape of the walkways, the color of 
the gravel, the shape of the flower beds, and the placement of the flowers within the beds, and he 
additionally continuously maintained the work. Telephone Interview with Chapman Kelley (Sept. 17, 
2019) (notes on file with author). In fact, due to the living nature of Kelley’s medium, he had to work 
much harder to create and maintain Wildflower Works than would have been required to create a 
painting, and he visited the piece every day to care for it. Id. In discussing his efforts to arrange the 
wildflowers and ensure that they would bloom year-round, Kelley described the project as a shotgun 












definition would eliminate the need to litigate complex and subjective 
questions, such as what qualifies as a “painting” or a “sculpture,”190 or 
whether or not a work has recognized stature.191 It also makes sense to have 
similarly broad definitions of visual art for copyright and VARA purposes 
because these laws ultimately have the same overall purpose: fostering 
creativity and encouraging innovative artistic design. Tellingly, expanding 
moral rights protection for visual art under VARA to match copyright would 
be more consistent with the Berne Convention, which protects all 
copyrightable works.192 
In conjunction with an expansion of the definition of visual art, certain 
exclusions and limitations qualifying this definition should also be 
eliminated as shown in Appendices A and B. This would require removing 
the exclusions for applied art and works for hire, explicitly allowing site-
specific work to receive protection, and removing the recognized stature 
limitation.193 These exceptions waste judicial resources by requiring parties 
to litigate difficult-to-define distinctions,194 and bar worthy or lesser-known 
artists from preserving their work at the outset.195 
This proposal is qualified by the assumption that such a change would 
be difficult to accomplish, as amending legislation is no simple feat, and 
property owners would likely oppose change. The consequences for public 
artists and the future of public art, however, are too high to ignore VARA’s 
 
a far cry from planting seeds and seeing what would happen, or even from planting a regular garden—
he designed the piece from start to finish, and meticulously maintained it in accordance with his artistic 
vision. In this way, it can be argued that Kelley authored the piece for the purposes of copyright. In 
addition, the fact that the flowers were not technically permanent should not preclude them from being 
considered “fixed” for copyright purposes, Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 
2020) (noting in the context of VARA that “[a]lthough a work’s short lifespan means that there will be 
fewer opportunities for the work to be viewed and evaluated, the temporary nature of the art is not a bar 
to recognized stature”), and the Seventh Circuit admitted this themselves. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305 (“We 
are not suggesting that copyright attaches only to works that are static or fully permanent . . . , or that 
artists who incorporate natural or living elements in their work can never claim copyright.”). Indeed, 
Kelley’s consistent efforts to maintain the piece for nearly two decades call into question if the work can 
even be considered temporary at all, and further highlight not only the stability of Wildflower Works but 
also Kelley’s authorship.  
190. See discussion of Kelley’s Wildflower Works, supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text. 
191. See discussion of the 5Pointz murals, supra notes 129–144 and accompanying text. 
192. Patrick Flynn, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Visual Artists Rights 
Act (17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq.), 138 A.L.R. Fed. 239, § 2[a] (2020) (“While the Berne Convention (and 
the European, primarily French, civil law on which many of its moral rights provisions are based) 
protects all copyrightable works, Congress chose to limit the application of moral rights to a narrowly 
enumerated list of visual art works.”). 
193. For the removal of the applied art and works for hire exclusions, as well as the inclusion of 
site-specific works, see Appendix A; for the removal of the recognized stature limitation, see Appendix 
B. 
194. In Cohen, for example, the court had to assess the stature of each of forty-nine individual 
murals at the whitewashed 5Pointz site. Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 439–41 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020). 
195. For more in-depth arguments supporting these changes, see supra Section II.B.  











shortcomings any longer. This proposal, which minimizes change to 
existing law by borrowing from copyright law, demonstrates, at the very 
least, that legislative change is achievable. 
B. Balancing of Interests 
Courts and lawmakers have resisted expanding protectable art under 
VARA beyond its narrow confines due to a fear of creating unlimited, 
unintended, and overly burdensome coverage.196 These concerns are fair, 
but unfounded in the context of VARA. After all, the Act already contains 
appropriate safeguards to balance the needs of artists and property owners 
even under an expanded definition of visual art. Much of these fears likely 
stem from the tension between the legal system’s value of the free transfer 
of property interests and VARA’s recognition of inalienable moral rights, 
retained by the artist even after transfer.197 This conflict should not hinder 
the expansion and strengthening of VARA for four reasons: (1) VARA only 
protects two limited yet important moral rights; (2) VARA already contains 
appropriate limitations; (3) in practice, property owners are often able to 
waive VARA liability; and (4) in order to receive protection, public artists 
must receive permission from landowners when placing public art on their 
property. Because “the American legal system highly values property rights 
and often resists protecting more conceptual rights, such as moral rights,”198 
VARA is currently imbalanced heavily in favor of property owners. The 
expansion of the definition of visual art in Appendices A and B would 
therefore merely help to even the balance by providing public artists basic 
moral rights, while still maintaining built-in protections for property 
owners. 
To start, VARA protects only the most basic and essential moral rights 
of artists: the right of attribution and the right of integrity.199 Real estate and 
property owners, against whom public artists most typically assert VARA 
rights, should therefore be easily able to comply with any restrictions 
imposed by VARA, even if the definition were extended to encompass a 
wider range of public art. The protections given artists under the right of 
attribution merely include artists’ right to claim ownership of their work and 
to prevent affiliation with work that has been modified or that they did not 
 
196. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
197. JONES, supra note 22, at 144 (“The economic and legal system of the US is one that 
historically and philosophically recognizes and encourages the transfer of property interests and 
therefore does not blend easily with a set of inalienable personality rights.”). For a discussion of the 
intersection between property law and art law, see Alexander, supra note 157.  
198. See Christopher R. Mathews, VARA’s Delicate Balance and the Crucial Role of the Waiver 
Provision: Its Current State and Its Future, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 139, 140 (2003). 












create.200 In addition, VARA protects the right of integrity by preventing 
artwork from being modified only if the modification is prejudicial to the 
artist’s reputation.201 Any modification, furthermore, must be intentional, 
and any destruction must be intentional or grossly negligent. 202  While 
protection from destruction may appear restrictive to landowners wishing to 
remove displayed artwork, when public art is attached to buildings or real 
property, the Act accounts for any added difficulty to property owners by 
allowing the owner of a building on which art is incorporated to destroy the 
art after a good-faith attempt to notify the artist or ninety-days’ notice.203 In 
order to more fully balance artistic and property interests following the 
proposed removal of the recognized stature limitation, the Building 
Exception found in 17 U.S.C §113 for the removal and destruction of works 
attached to a building should be incorporated into 17 U.S.C § 106A and 
applied to all artworks, not just those affixed to buildings.204 With this 
change, all public artists would receive protection from destroyed or 
damaged work. Property, however, would remain unencumbered, as a 
property owner would merely need to provide ninety-days’ notice in order 
to give the artist the option to remove the work at the artist’s own expense 
before being able to freely destroy or remove artworks. 
VARA has numerous additional built-in protections that balance artists’ 
interests in preserving their work with real estate owners’ interests in 
unencumbered property, and would continue to do so under an expanded 
definition of protected art. Unlike copyright protection, VARA protections 
last only for the life of the artist.205 In addition, VARA protections belong 
only to the artist and cannot be transferred to or asserted by anyone else.206 
Significantly, VARA also protects property owners by providing that any 
modifications resulting from “the passage of time” or “the inherent nature 
of the materials” are not a violation of the Act,207 nor are any modifications 
due to “conservation” or “public presentation.” 208  These limits are 
especially relevant in the context of public art displayed outdoors and in the 
 
200. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2) (2018). 
201. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
202. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B).  
203. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2) (2018); see supra Section II.B.4. 
204. See Appendix B. 
205. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2018) (“Copyright . . . endures for a term consisting of the life 
of the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”), with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (“[R]ights 
conferred . . . shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.”). 
206. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e). 
207. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1). 
208. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2). The public presentation exception includes changes to “lighting and 
placement.” Id. 











elements, and ensure that property owners will not be held responsible for 
inevitable wear and tear.209 
In accounting for the interests of property owners, VARA goes even 
further than these limitations on the scope of moral rights: VARA allows art 
purchasers to entirely avoid the possibility of VARA liability by contracting 
with artists to waive their VARA rights.210 The ability to waive VARA 
rights when artists sign contracts with property managers to create and 
install public art pieces does not make it any less crucial to create an 
inclusive definition of art in order to further the Act’s policy goals.211 Even 
when waived, placing the initial right in the artist gives artists significantly 
more bargaining power, such as to ask for more favorable contract terms in 
exchange for a waiver.212 Expanded VARA protections will also send the 
message to property owners and society at large that public art should be 
valued and encouraged. 
It lastly must be made clear that this Note does not advocate for public 
art to receive protection under VARA if it has been placed on a site 
illegally. 213  Landowners will not violate VARA, for example, if they 
remove graffiti that was placed on their property without permission.214 
Property owners, therefore, need not be afraid of increased VARA 
protections sanctioning or protecting vandalism, and such illegal acts will 
 
209. See, e.g., Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(applying the passage of time exception). 
210. This is explicitly allowed under 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (allowing for the waiver of VARA 
rights through express agreement “in a written instrument signed by the author”). The waiver provision, 
while advantageous to property owners, also balances artists’ interests by requiring the waiver to be 
express and in writing. Id. 
211. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
212. See Mathews, supra note 198, at 154 (“The waiver’s effect on the bargaining positions of 
artists and art purchasers is arguably more important than the actual frequency of the waiver.”); see also 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 188, § 8D.06[D] (discussing waiver in light of the “imbalance in the 
economic bargaining power of the parties” and noting the threat of “routine waivers” (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-514, at 18, 22 (1990))). 
213. English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997) (“VARA is inapplicable to artwork that is illegally placed on the property of 
others, without their consent, when such artwork cannot be removed from the site in question.”), aff’d 
sub nom. English v. BFC Partners, 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999). But see Celia Lerman, Protecting 
Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 295, 330–36 
(2013); Sara Cloon, Incentivizing Graffiti: Extending Copyright Protection to a Prominent Artistic 
Movement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 54 (2016). While this Note proposes changes seeking to 
expand and promote the creation of public art, including graffiti, it does not advocate for artists to create 
public works without consent, and hopes instead that more property owners will be open to contracting 
with public artists. 
214. Graffiti is used as an example here because it is a common and well-known form of 
vandalism. However, it must be acknowledged that graffiti art is different from graffiti vandalism, and 
the latter is what is meant here. See Marisa A. Gómez, The Writing on Our Walls: Finding Solutions 
Through Distinguishing Graffiti Art from Graffiti Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633, 697 (1993) 
(“[N]ot all graffiti is vandalism, but . . . graffiti may become vandalism when it is done in an 












not be encouraged. Instead, an expansion of VARA would protect deserving 
public art from modification or destruction when, for instance, a previously 
obliging landowner changes his or her mind regarding display.215   
Given these limitations on VARA’s scope, expanding the definition of 
visual art and the works included within it will both better encourage the 
creation and preservation of art and appropriately recognize the needs of the 
property owners who make the public display of art possible. In fact, as 
these limits show, VARA would still, even if expanded as proposed, favor 
property owners.216 An expanded definition of visual art as outlined by this 
Note is therefore necessary to merely give public artists basic protections—
not a lot to ask.  
C. Cultural Shift 
Because VARA is perceived to be cumbersome for property owners, 
expanding the definition of visual art could have the unintended 
consequence of hurting the development of public art if property owners 
will no longer want to purchase artworks due to fear of liability. This means 
that expanding the definition of visual art alone is not enough. In addition 
to legislative reform, we need to create a culture that values public art in its 
communities. Currently, property rights dominate in the United States.217 
Rather than one interest dominating the other, however, artists’ and property 
owners’ interests can dovetail to create mutually beneficial arrangements. 
This would involve educating artists about their legal rights and giving them 
appropriate bargaining tools,218 while at the same time educating property 
owners both about the value of displaying a robust collection of public 
artworks and the low burden that VARA places upon them so that they will 
not be discouraged from purchasing new pieces. Finally, those 
commissioning public artworks should involve the public, such as by 
seeking out input regarding art that will be placed in the spaces that 
community members use and enjoy on a daily basis.219 Working together, 
public artists, property owners, and the public can preserve and grow the 
rich culture of our communities. 
 
215. See, e.g., discussion of the 5Pointz murals, supra notes 129–144 and accompanying text.  
216. This is especially apparent in the waiver provision. See supra notes 210–212 and 
accompanying text.  
217. See supra notes 197–198 and accompanying text. 
218. Many artists are “oblivious to art laws.” Jessica L. Darraby, Personal Reflections on Art Law, 
12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 298, 300 (1990). 
219. Salil K. Gandhi, Note, The Pendulum of Art Procurement Policy: The Art-in-Architecture 
Program’s Struggle to Balance Artistic Freedom and Public Acceptance, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 535, 547–
53, 557 (2002) (analyzing the benefits and drawbacks of community involvement in the commissioning 
process to avoid community rejection of public artworks after installation, and ultimately advocating for 
a balance between “artistic freedom and public harmony”). 












VARA does not sufficiently protect public artists’ moral rights. A better 
understanding of public art from an artistic, rather than legal, point of view 
can help lawmakers and courts identify and implement more sufficient 
protections. An artistic perspective is necessary when considering VARA 
reform because it encourages a deeper appreciation of the value of many 
forms of artistic expression. The broader and more flexible definition of 
visual art proposed by this Note can help bridge the gap between art and art 
law by offering legal protection to a wider breadth of works that are 
invariably recognized as art by art scholars and consumers, but not by legal 
scholars and judges. These changes cannot and should not occur overnight, 
and thus the first step to the preservation of America’s public artworks is a 
more widespread recognition of the important role that public art, and 
therefore the artists who create it, plays in our everyday lives. From statues 
providing beauty, education, and community gathering in public parks and 
plazas, to sculptures enhancing otherwise barren corporate lobbies or murals 
coloring bleak concrete and brick, the public interacts with public art on a 
daily basis. Reform is necessary to protect and encourage the continued 
creation of these artworks, because while most can afford to take the 
vulnerability of public art for granted, the artists who devote their 
livelihoods to creating it simply cannot.  
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Appendix A: Proposed Definitional Language220 
17 U.S.C. § 101 
A “work of visual art” is— 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, including site-specific 
works, which would receive copyright protection in 
accordance with section 102 as an original work of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium or expression, now 
known or later developed, existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a 
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 
200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author 
and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; 
or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes 
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or 
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author. 
A work of visual art does not include— 
(A) (i)  any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, 
model, applied art,  motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic 
information service, electronic publication, or similar 
publication; 
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, 
descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container; 
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i)     
or (ii); or 
(B) any work made for hire; or 
(B) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.  
 
220. Additions to the current statute are italicized and underlined. Deletions are struck through.  











Appendix B: Proposed VARA Language221 
17 U.S.C. § 106A 
 
(a) RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY.—Subject to section 107 and 
independent of the exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author 
of a work of visual art— 
 
(1) shall have the right— 
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and 
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work 
of visual art which he or she did not create; 
 
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the 
author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and 
 
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the 
right— 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or 
her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that 
right, and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature visual 
art, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work is a violation of that right. 
 
(i)  If a property owner wishes to destroy a work of visual art, 
the author’s rights under paragraphs (2) and (3) of this 
section shall apply unless— 
(a) the owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt 
without success to notify the author of the owner’s 
intended action affecting the work of visual art, or 
(b) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the 
person so notified failed, within 90 days after receiving 
such notice, either to remove the work or to pay for its 
removal. 
 












(ii) For purposes of subparagraph (a), an owner shall be 
presumed to have made a diligent, good faith attempt to 
send notice if the owner sent such notice by registered mail 
to the author at the most recent address of the author that 
was recorded with the Register of Copyrights pursuant to 
section 113(d)(3). If the work is removed at the expense of 
the author, title to that copy of the work shall be deemed to 
be in the author.222 
. . . . 
 
222. This language comes from 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2018). 
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